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Abstract 
Team work can have a positive impact on student learning 
and commitment, but it is challenging to determine a 
method of assessment that does not require lecturers to 
involve themselves intimately with each team. Team 
members are often the best source of meaningful data, and 
as a result, lecturers are including self and peer 
assessment.  One method of peer assessment is to have 
team members quantify their own contribution and that of 
team members. Concerns have been raised in the 
literature about distribution patterns with this method of 
peer assessment. An online peer assessment system has 
been capturing data from a capstone project course for 
three years with over 24 teams and 100 students each 
year. This paper analyses the following questions: do 
students take the easy option of equal distribution to avoid 
conflict, are students honest about their own contribution, 
are females treated fairly and are international students 
unfairly discriminated against. 1 
Keywords:  peer assessment, teamwork, capstone project. 
1 Introduction 
Rewarding a student with an individual grade is 
challenging in a capstone project course due to the team 
and project structure – the work products vary between 
projects and an individual’s contribution can be hard to 
identify. As stated by Wilkins and Lawhead (2000) many 
instructors shy away from team project situations, partly 
because of the challenge to devise a way to assign grades 
to individual team members. Gates, Delgado, Mondragon 
(2000) identified the importance of structuring individual 
accountability to ensure that all members of a team 
contribute to the project concluding that team members 
are often the best source of meaningful data. 
Software Engineering Project is a 26-week capstone 
program divided into two consecutive 13-week units; the 
students get two grades. The students undertake real 
industry projects suggested by local businesses in teams 
of 4-5 students, occasionally 3. Students form their own 
teams and choose a project from the list of suitable 
projects (Clark 2005). Table 1 summarises the team and 
student configuration data from 2004, 2005, and 2006.  
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 2004 2005 2006 
Total Teams 27 25 24 
Teams of 5 students 21 19 20 
Teams of 4 (or less) students  6 6 4 
Teams with gender mix  11 10 16 
Teams > 2 of both genders  2 2 7 
Teams all-domestic students 20 14 10 
Teams all-international students 3 5 4 
Teams with domicile mix 4 6 10 
Teams > 2 of each domicile 1 3 3 
Total Students 129 118 115 
Females (mixed gender teams) 13 17 24 
Males (mixed gender teams) 41 30 52 
Males (not  mixed) 75 71 39 
Domestics (mixed domicile) 11 13 22 
Domestics (not  mixed) 96 65 47 
Internationals  (mixed domicile) 8 16 26 
Internationals (not mixed) 14 24 20 
Table 1: Team and student data 2004 , 2005, 2006 
The number of female students has increased steadily 
over the years. The number of international students 
doubled in 2005 as students from China, who had 
completed the first 1 – 1.5 years of their degree in China, 
came to Tasmania to complete the final 1.5 – 2 years of 
their degree. All international students are temporarily in 
Australia to study and the majority are Chinese (71%). 
In Software Engineering Project students receive a grade 
that reflects their input into the project. One of the main 
sources of assessment data is peer assessment. A range of 
tools are used to allow students to indicate their own 
contribution and that of team members, all of these are 
described in detail in Clark, Davies and Skeers (2005): 
• Timesheets – an online version of the timesheets 
described by Humphrey(1997).  
• Individual Contribution Reports – a personal report 
detailing their contribution to a work product. Each 
student also has to indicate agreement or 
disagreement (including explanation) with the reports 
written by each of their team members. 
• Self/Peer Evaluation Surveys – students rate each 
team member (including self) on a list of behavioural 
characteristics of good team work.  
• Work Product Pay Packet – each team member gives 
a quantitative opinion of how much each team 
member contributed to a work product. 
The timesheets are assessed weekly. The other peer 
assessments are conducted at the conclusion of a major 
work product (eg design report). Once the work product 
has been assessed a meeting is held with the lecturer to 
receive feedback on the work product and discuss the 
peer assessment data. 
An analysis of the numbers input into the Work Product 
Pay Packet (WPPP) is the focus of this paper. The 
approach is similar to that described by Hayes, 
Lethbridge and Port (2003) and Kennedy (2005) and the 
numbers are used similar to the way Brown (1995) used 
the numbers from the Autorating system. Clark (2005) 
gives a detailed description of the evolution of the tool 
and how it is used in the assessment process to determine 
a final mark. In first semester 2004 each student had to 
distribute 20 marks amongst their team members, since 
second semester 2004 the students distributed a virtual 
$100, using a work product pay packet form, Figure 1. 
They are told to distribute the amount between team 
members based on the quality and quantity of work 
contributed by each individual. In 2004 the WPPPs were 
used 7 times and in 2005 they were used 10 times and in 
first semester 2006 they have been used 3 times. There is 
a pay packet associated with each of the design reports (3 
a year) and at least one for each software release (2 a 
year). Pay packets are also used to quantify contribution 
to documentation and marketing work products.  
Kaufmann (2000), Layton and Ohland (2001) and Hayes 
et al (2003) all used a process of having students quantify 
the contribution of team members, but they expressed 
some concerns about undesirable distribution patterns. 
Kaufmann (2000) raised concerns about team members 
forming a pact to give equal amounts to avoid conflict, 
and concerns about individuals inflating their own 
performance. Hayes et al (2003) raised concerns that 
team members may “gang up” on another member (form 
partial team pacts). Kaufmann (2000) and Layton and 
Ohland (2001) both raised concerns about gender and 
ethnicity bias. Kennedy (2005) asked whether peer 
assessment was worth the effort, concluding that marks 
awarded to individuals based on peer assessment differ 
only slightly from equal allocation.   
This paper focuses on the data contained in the WPPPs in 
2004, 2005 and first semester 2006, and analyses the 
following questions: do students take the easy option of 
equal distribution, are students honest about their own 
contribution, are females treated fairly and are 
international students unfairly discriminated against.  
2 Do students take the easy option of equal 
distribution? 
As shown in Table 2, in 2004 the students gave equal 
amounts to all their team members 50% of the possible 
times (number of students 129 x 7 tests). In first semester 
it was 59% of the time, whereas in second semester it was 
only 44%. In 2005 the students gave equal amounts 43% 
of the time. Again there was a drop from first to second 
semester, but only 8%. In first semester 2006 the students 
gave equal amounts 23% of the time - a dramatic 
reduction on the previous two years.  
In 2004, females gave equal amounts 37% of the time – 
considerably less than males, but this was reversed in 
2005 and then reversed again in 2006. This indicates that 
equal distribution is not influenced by gender.  
In 2004, international students gave equal amounts 70% 
of the time considerably more than domestic students. In 
2005 this was reduced by 10% and in 2006 this was 
reduced by nearly 50%. The data does indicate that 
international students are significantly more likely to 
distribute amounts equally than domestic students. 
There are a number of reasons why students may 
distribute amounts equally: 
1. They genuinely believe the contribution was equal. 
2. They are lazy or doing the form in a hurry. 
3. They are trying to disguise their own contribution – 
be it too much or too little. 
 Pay Comments 
Jim 30 
Claire 30 
Ben 15 
Max 10 
Colin 15 
Total $100 
Both Claire and I undertook the 
majority of the release 2 
implementation while the others 
concentrated on the 
documentation 
 
 
 Jim Claire Ben Max Colin Pay 
Jim 30 25 30 30 25 140 
Claire 30 25 25 25 25 130 
Ben 15 15 15 15 15 75 
Max 10 15 15 10 15 65 
Colin 15 20 15 20 20 90 
Figure 1: Work Product Pay Packet and Work 
Product Pay Packet Team Summary 
  N Possible % of Possible 
Females 34 91 37 
Males 419 812 52 
Domestics 345 749 46 
Internationals 108 154 70 
Semester 1 228 387 59 
Semester 2 225 516 44 
2004 
Total 453 903 55 
Females 92 170 54 
Males 415 1010 41 
Domestics 269 780 35 
Internationals 238 400 60 
Semester 1 279 590 47 
Semester 2 229 590 39 
2005 
Total 508 1180 43 
Females 13 72 18 
Males 67 273 25 
Domestics 33 207 16 
Internationals 47 138 34 
2006 
Semester 1 80 345 23 
Table 2: Individuals who gave equal amounts to all 
team members 
4. They disagree with peer assessment and refuse “to do 
the lecturers work for them”. 
5. They have a pact and believe other team members 
will also distribute equally.  
Students are able to write comments on the WPPPs and 
many students do confirm that they mean to give an equal 
distribution because they believe this was the contribution 
pattern. Reasons 2, 3 and 4 are fairly easy for the lecturer 
to identify after reading the Individual Contribution 
Reports, Timesheets and the WPPPs from other members. 
The offenders are quizzed at the meeting with the lecturer 
and tend not be repeat offenders. Though students doing 
it for reason 4 can be hard to dissuade. 
Teams that have a pact to distribute equally are a concern. 
Often teams form a pact to all contribute equally (which 
is great) and agree to do the distribution equally – sadly 
the contribution is not equal but members still distribute 
equally. There are indications that when a team makes a 
pact that it is hard to break – with 4 teams in 2004 and 3 
in 2005 hardly wavering at all. Though in 2004 on only 5 
(out of 26) pay packets and in 2005 on only 4 (out of 34) 
pay packets was the lecturer able to discern a different 
contribution by each member based on the Individual 
Contribution Reports indicating that these team members 
did do an equal contribution most of the time. 
As shown in Table 3, in 2004 an entire team gave equal 
amounts to all their team members 22% of the possible 
times (number of teams 27 x 7 tests each). In 2005 it was 
reduced to just 15 % of the time. In 2006 it was only 6% 
of the time. Teams consisting entirely of international 
students are most likely to distribute equally. In 2004, the 
all-international teams gave equal amounts 76% of the 
time. In 2005, it was reduced to 58% of the time – but a 
staggering eleven times more often than the all-domestic  
teams. In first semester 2006, the all-international teams 
gave equal amounts only 25% of the time – but all-
domestic teams have been reduced to 0%. In 2004 there 
were three teams that gave the same amount every time, 
two of them were entirely domestic teams, the other was 
entirely international. There was another international 
team that rewarded evenly 5 out of 7 times. In 2005 there 
were three international teams that gave the same amount 
9, 8 and 7 times out of 10. The most an all domestic team 
rewarded evenly was 3 times in 2005.  
The most interesting revelation from all years is that 
mixed domicile teams (teams with both international and 
domestic students) nearly never (once only in 2005 and 
2006) gave equal amounts to everyone.  
Table 3 shows that teams of 4 (or less) are more likely to 
distribute amounts equally than teams of 5. In both 2004 
and 2005 only one team of 4 was entirely international 
students and none were in 2006. In 2004, teams of 4 gave 
equal amounts 64% of the time – four times more often 
than the teams of 5. In 2004 there was one international 
team of 4 and one domestic team of 4 that gave equal 
distribution every time. In 2005, there was a significant 
reduction in the number of times teams of 4 gave equal 
amounts, but there was one international team of 4 that 
gave equal amounts 8 times out of 10. In first semester 
2006 teams of 4 never gave equal distribution.  
Since the teams stay the same and continue to work on 
the same project it is interesting to consider the four 
factors that influence the students to not distribute 
amounts equally.  
Firstly, in 2004 a change was made to the amount the 
students had to distribute between semesters – in first 
semester they had only 20 marks to distribute but in 
second semester they had a virtual $100. The reasons for 
this change are discussed in Clark et al (2005). This 
allowed students to be more discerning, a large number of 
students only differentiate by a $1 between team 
members. In 2004, 25 of the equal distributions by teams 
were done in first semester, and 17 in second semester 
when 4 of the 7 tests were conducted. 
Secondly, students have been advised in course materials 
and in lectures not to make a pact, the following has been 
in the Project Manual (the unit bible) since 2004: 
“It is tempting to have a pact with your team members to 
always give high ratings. You are advised not to do this. 
This encourages individuals not to do their share of the 
work and you will end up carrying them or submitting 
sub-quality work. You should respond based on your 
opinion of each person’s contribution. You should find 
that if you are honest with each other you will all learn 
more and improve, as students are often in a better 
position to provide one another with meaningful feedback 
regarding both technical and interpersonal performance.” 
(Herbert, Ollington 2006, pg 9). 
When an entire team distributed amounts equally they 
were quizzed at a follow-up meeting with the lecturer as 
to whether this was really a true reflection of the work 
completed. In 2005 teams were advised at the follow-up 
meeting that this indicated that the team felt they all 
deserved the same mark for that work product but that 
they would all get the same lowest mark determined by 
the lecturer based on the Individual Contribution Reports 
  N Possible % of  Possible 
Teams of 5 24 161 15 
Teams of 4  18 28 64 
All-international 16 21 76 
All-domestic 26 140 19 
Mixed domicile 0 28 0 
2004 
Total 42 189 22 
Teams of 5 26 190 14 
Teams of 4  11 60 18 
All-international 29 50 58 
All-domestic 7 140 5 
Mixed domicile 1 60 2 
2005 
Total 37 250 15 
Teams of 5 4 60 7 
Teams of 4  0 12 0 
All-international 3 12 25 
All-domestic 0 30 0 
Mixed domicile 1 30 3 
2006 
Total 4 72 6 
Table 3: Entire team gave equal amounts 
and timesheets. The impact of this is indicated by the 
number of teams that only reward evenly once. In 2006 
from the very first follow-up meeting with the lecturer 
teams were given this warning when only a single 
member of the team distributed amounts equally. This 
appears to have had a dramatic effect in 2006. In 2004 
there were five teams that rewarded evenly once in first 
semester only, and four other teams rewarded evenly 4 or 
less times with only one of these teams doing it again 
once in second semester. In 2005 there were seven teams 
that all rewarded evenly 4 or less times, with five teams 
doing it once in first semester only. In 2006 there were 
four different teams that all rewarded evenly once – two 
on the first pay packet and one each on the second and 
third pay packet.  
Thirdly, students receive two formative marks during first 
semester that indicate the influence of the pay packets. 
The impact of this is also indicated by the number of 
teams that only reward evenly once. Also at the end of 
first semester students receive a grade and are thus made 
aware (in some cases painfully) of the impact of carrying 
other team members on their own overall results. The 
impact of this is indicated by the number of teams that 
reward evenly consistently in first semester but rarely in 
second semester (4 teams in 2004, and 2 in 2005).  
Finally, in first semester students have to allocate work 
equally during all phases of the lifecycle (particularly 
design and implementation), but in second semester they 
are advised to allocate work based on students particular 
strengths while ensuring everyone does the same overall 
amount of work. If teams do this you would expect the 
pay packets to be less equal in second semester.  
3 Are students honest about themselves? 
A major concern with having students quantify 
contributions is that they will exaggerate their own 
contribution. In 2004 students gave themselves the 
highest amount 191 times. In 134 cases they gave the 
same amount to at least one other member of their team, 
but not the entire team. From table 4 you can see that in 
both 2004 and 2005 students gave themselves the highest 
amount around 21% of the time and in 2006 this has 
increased to 26%. International students gave themselves 
the highest amount less often than the other categories, 
but the earlier section demonstrated that they are much 
more likely to give equal amounts to everyone. 
Do students give themselves the highest amount when 
they shouldn’t? In 2004 of the 191 cases where a student 
gave themselves the highest amount other team members 
gave them their highest amount 142 times, 74%. In 2005 
203 of the 257 cases had agreement, 79%. In 2006, 77 of 
the 91 cases had agreement, 84%. Graph 1 shows that 
79% of the time team members agreed that a member 
should have had the highest amount. It also shows that 
over 52% of cases had the agreement of at least two other 
team members (meaning more than half the team agreed 
on who should get the highest amount). Graph 2 shows 
how often the people who agreed gave the student the 
same, more or less money than they gave themselves. 
21% of the time they weren’t willing to give them as 
much money as students gave themselves. This analysis 
indicates that giving yourself the highest amount is 
justified in the majority of cases, but there are some 
students giving themselves the highest amount when the 
rest of the team does not agree. 
Do students give themselves the highest amount when 
they should? Over the three years, when at least two 
members agreed that another member should be given the 
highest amount in only 59% of these cases did the 
member agree. When at least three people agreed that 
another member should get the highest amount the 
member agreed only 70% of the time. So it seems some 
individuals do not give themselves the highest amount 
when they should. 
 Possible Highest to themselves 
Others 
equal high 
% of  
possible 
Lowest to 
themselves 
Others 
equal low 
% of 
possible 
Females 91 2 23 27 9 7 18 
Males 812 55 111 20 29 39 8 
Domestics 749 51 117 22 29 42 9 
Internationals 154 6 17 15 9 4 8 
2004 
Total 903 57 134 21 38 46 9 
Females 170 11 20 18 4 28 19 
Males 1010 92 134 22 65 123 19 
Domestics 780 74 127 26 61 93 18 
Internationals 400 29 27 14 8 58 17 
2005 
Total 1180 103 154 22 69 151 19 
Females 72 0 15 21 10 15 35 
Males 273 33 43 28 23 33 21 
Domestics 207 29 36 31 24 28 25 
Internationals 138 4 22 19 9 20 21 
2006 
Total 345 33 58 26 33 48 23 
Table 4: Individuals that gave themselves their highest/lowest amount (but NOT equal amount to all) 
No agreement
21%
1 person agrees
27%
2 persons agree
22%
3 persons agree
19%
4 persons agree
11%
Graph 1: How many agreed a person should be given 
the highest amount 
Gave less
21%
1 person same 
amount
25%
1 person higher 
amount
24%
2 or more higher 
amount
14%
2 or more same 
amount
16%
Graph 2: How often the agreer gave equal, more or 
less money than student gave themselves 
As shown on the right side of table 4, in 2004 students 
gave themselves the lowest amount 84 times. In 46 cases 
they shared an equally low amount with at least one other 
member of their team, but not the entire team. From 2004 
to 2005 there was a significant increase in the number of 
students who gave themselves the lowest amount. This 
change possibly occurred as a result in the change of 
amounts being distributed in 2004 (20 marks in first 
semester versus $100 in second semester) which meant in 
2004 many more students distributed equal amounts. 
Strangely there was no change in the number of students 
who gave themselves the highest amount. 
In 2004 and 2006 female students were more likely to 
give themselves the lowest amount, but this was not 
indicated in 2005. In 2005 there were two gender mixed 
teams where the majority of students were female (only 
one male). There has only been one other team where 
females have out numbered males and the ratio was 3:2. 
Do students give themselves the lowest amount too often? 
In 2004 of the 84 cases where a student gave themselves 
the lowest amount other team members gave them their 
lowest amount 66 times, 78%. In 2005 175 of the 220 
cases had agreement, 80%. In 2006, 60 of the 81 cases 
had agreement, 77%. This indicates that giving yourself 
the lowest amount is justified in the majority of cases, but 
there are some students being too hard on themselves. 
Do students give themselves the lowest amount often 
enough? Over the three years, when at least two members 
agreed that another member should be given the lowest 
amount in only 44% of these cases did the member agree. 
When at least three people agreed that another member 
should get the lowest amount the member agreed only 
50% of the time. It seems many individuals do not give 
themselves the lowest amount when they should. 
It is worth noting that over 71% of the time at least 2 
people gave the same or more than the person gave 
themselves as shown in Graph 3, which is at least half the 
rest of the team. Again it is encouraging that 58% of the 
time at most 1 person in a team thinks a person should get 
less than they gave themselves, as shown in graph 4. 
These two graphs are indicating that in the majority of 
cases an individual is giving themselves an amount that 
the majority of the team agrees with. 
This evidence suggests that student quantification of 
contribution should not be used in isolation and that it is 
necessary to have other forms of evaluating the 
contribution of individuals to confirm the quantitative 
opinions of the students. Two other methods utilized in 
Software Engineering Project are timesheets filled in by 
an individual and individual contribution reports written 
by a team member about their contribution to a work 
product and agreed with by other team members, these 
are further described in Clark et al (2005).  
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4 Are female students treated fairly? 
Graph 5 shows the average amounts given to team 
members based on gender. Graph 5 indicates that males 
gave fellow males in a mixed gender team lower amounts 
than males do to fellow males that are in all male teams. 
Males in 2005 gave higher amounts to females than 
males, in 2004 and 2006 they gave slightly lower 
amounts to females. Male students gave female students 
lower amounts than female students gave to fellow 
female students. In 2004 and 2005 females gave higher 
amounts to females than males. In 2006 females gave 
higher amounts to males than they gave to females.  In 
2005 and 2006 females gave higher amounts to male 
students than male students gave each other. So in 
conclusion, the individual amounts are not showing any 
consistent gender bias.  
Table 5 is showing the significance of differences in 
average individual allocations by genders for 2005 and 
2006. All levels of significance are determined using a 
Mann-Whitney nonparametric test for significance 
between the distributions of two independent samples,  
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with statistical significance defined by p<0.05. Table 5 is 
showing that all the differences in 2005 were not 
significant but that the difference between what males 
gave to females and what males gave males was 
significant in the first semester of 2006. 
Graph 6 shows the average total amounts (the 
accumulation of all the WPPP amounts) and indicates that 
in 2004 and 2006 female students averaged less than their 
male students, but in 2005 females were averaging 
slightly higher than males in mixed teams.  
Table 6 is showing the number of times the maximum 
and minimum total amounts were given to different 
groupings of students in the mixed teams.  In 2005 and 
2006 female students were given the minimum total 
amount more often than their male team members. In 
2004 and 2006 female students were given the maximum 
total amount less often than their male team members. 
Since the distribution patterns have not been consistent 
over the three years it is not possible to conclude that 
there is a gender bias. 
2005 Semester 1, 2006   
N Average 
amounts 
p N Average 
amounts 
p 
1 Male to Female 
Male to Male (mix) 
377 
932 
20.48 
19.5 
0.1515 219 
534 
19.53 
20.10 
<.0001
2 Male to Female 
Female to Female 
377 
160 
20.48 
20.98 
0.0735 219 
126 
19.53 
20.15 
0.0526 
3 Female to Male 
Female to Female 
375 
160 
20.13 
20.98 
0.4483 219 
126 
20.66 
20.15 
0.0436 
4 Female to Male 
Male to Male (mix) 
375 
932 
20.13 
19.5 
0.2483 219 
534 
20.66 
20.10 
0.4207 
Table 5: Significance of differences in average individual allocations for 2005 and 2006 
 
 N Possible Minimum % of poss Maximum % of poss 
Females 13 91 33 36 30 33 
2004 
Males in mixed 41 287 117 41 123 43 
Females 17 170 89 52 84 49 
2005 
Males in mixed 30 300 138 46 125 42 
Females 24 72 30 42 19 26 
2006 
Males in mixed 52 156 38 24 54 35 
Table 6: Minimum and Maximum total amount distribution 
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5 Are international students unfairly 
discriminated against? 
Graph 7 shows the average amounts given to team 
members based on domicile. Table 7 is showing the 
significance of differences in average individual 
allocations by domicile for 2005 and 2006. Graph 7 
indicates that domestic students in both mixed and non-
mixed teams average around the same amount for each 
other in all years, with domestics in mixed teams being 
fractionally higher. Domestic students gave international 
students lower amounts than they gave fellow domestic 
students and this difference was significant (Table 7, row 
1). Domestic students gave international students lower 
amounts than international students gave each other in all 
years and the difference was significant (Table 7, row 3). 
International students gave domestic students 
significantly more than domestic students gave domestics 
students in 2005 (Table 7, row 2), interestingly 
international students gave domestic students less than 
domestics students gave each other in 2004 and 2006! 
Internationals students gave lower amounts to fellow 
international students rather than fellow domestic 
students in 2005 and 2006, the reverse happened in 2004,  
91
93
95
97
99
101
103
105
Domestic (not
mixed)
Domestic
(mixed)
International
(mixed)
International
(not mixed)
To
ta
l D
ol
la
rs
2004
2005
2006
Graph 8: Average total amounts 
the difference in 2005 and 2006 was significant (Table 7, 
row 4). Internationals in mixed teams gave significantly 
lower amounts to each other than internationals in non-
mixed teams (Table 7, row 5), though all-international 
teams distribute amounts equally often, whereas no (or 
nearly no) mixed teams did. 
Graph 8 indicates that domestics in mixed teams regularly 
received average total amounts higher than domestics in 
non-mixed teams. Internationals in mixed teams 
consistently got lower amounts than internationals in non-
mixed teams. Domestics in mixed teams got higher 
amounts than internationals in mixed teams in all years. 
There was no indication of a problem in 2004, but in 
2004 the amount of equal distribution was the highest. 
2005 data indicated a potential problem that is also being 
seen so far in 2006. In 2005 and 2006 the number of 
international students increased significantly on 2004.  
Table 8 indicates that in all years internationals in mixed 
teams were twice as likely to be given the minimum total 
amount. Likewise in all years the international students 
were less likely to be given the maximum amount.  
2005 Semester 1, 2006   
N Average 
amounts 
p N Average 
amounts 
p 
1 Domestic to Domestic (mix) 
Domestic to International 
220 
290 
20.51 
17.98 
<.0001 186 
132 
20.74 
19.05 
<.0001 
2 International to Domestic 
Domestic to Domestic (mix) 
290 
220 
20.78 
20.51 
0.0143 132 
186 
20.22 
20.74 
0.2676 
3 International to International (mix) 
Domestic to International 
320 
290 
19.47 
17.98 
0.002 246 
132 
19.21 
19.05 
0.0375 
4 International to International (mix) 
International to Domestic 
320 
290 
19.47 
20.78 
<0.0001 246 
132 
19.21 
20.22 
0.0001 
5 International to International (mix) 
International to International (not mixed) 
320 
920 
19.47 
20.22 
<0.0001 246 
300 
19.21 
20.69 
0.0031 
Table 7: Significance of differences in average individual allocations for 2005 and 2006 
 N Possible Minimum % of poss Maximum % of poss 
Domestics in mixed 11 77 13 17 29 38 
2004 
Internationals in mixed 8 56 19 34 13 23 
Domestics in mixed 13 130 25 19 39 30 
2005 
Internationals in mixed 16 160 65 41 35 22 
Domestics in mixed 22 66 12 18 27 41 
2006 
Internationals in mixed 26 78 28 36 11 14 
Table 8: Minimum and Maximum total amount distribution 
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Graph 9: Average Final Marks 
So all this analysis indicates that there maybe an issue of 
domicile bias, but maybe the differences in allocations 
are justified. An analysis of the final marks is necessary 
to determine if there is unfair discrimination. 
The entire software development lifecycle is repeated 
each semester. In the first semester teams complete 
release one (or a third of the project), in second semester 
they complete release two (the remaining two-thirds). 
Graph 9 shows the average final marks for release 1 in all 
years and for release 2 in 2004 and 2005.  
In 2004 and 2005 domestic students in mixed or non-
mixed domicile teams were achieving around the same 
results in each semester. In both years in first semester 
domestics in mixed teams got slightly higher results than 
domestics in non-mixed teams but this was reversed in 
both years in second  semester. In 2006 domestics in non-
mixed teams have got slightly higher marks than 
domestics in mixed teams.  
Overall graph 9 indicates that international students 
whether in mixed or non-mixed teams are averaging 
around the same grade but less than domestic students. 
Though in second semester 2004 international students in 
mixed teams got significantly lower results. This result is 
partially explained by the fact that there were only 8 
international students in mixed teams and 4 of them were 
in the one team and that team did not do well.  In 2005 
international students in mixed teams achieved 
significantly higher results in first semester to 
international students in non-mixed teams (8%), but in 
second semester the difference was only 1.5%, and table 
9 shows this difference was not significant.  
In all years international students in mixed teams 
consistently achieved lower average final marks that 
domestic students in mixed teams. Table 9 shows that the 
difference was significant in second semester 2005. 
The final marks are calculated using the WPPPs and so 
they are not completely independent. The teams have to 
produce three design reports, two in first semester and 
one in second each worth 10% for the team. The teams 
developed a release of the software in each semester. The 
team marks for these work products are not influenced by 
peer assessment. 
There has been no significant differences in marks for 
design reports for domestic student whether in a mixed or 
non-mixed team, in the majority of cases the differences 
have been less than 2% except for design report 2 in 2006 
when the difference was 10%. An analysis does indicate 
though that internationals in mixed teams do achieve 
higher results than internationals in non-mixed teams for 
the design reports (over 20% for design report 1 in 2005 
and 2006), and table 9 confirms that the difference was 
significant for design report 3 in 2005 where the 
difference was only 11%.  
Graph 10 shows the team software results for release 1. 
Domestic students averaged around the same in both 
mixed and non-mixed teams though the difference in 
2006 is larger than the other two years. International 
students in mixed teams averaged slightly higher than 
those in non-mixed teams. The difference between 
international students in mixed and non-mixed teams was 
significant in second semester 2005, as shown in table 9. 
So the analysis indicates that there is no significant 
difference in the results of domestic students whether in a  
 N Average Mark p 
Semester 2 individual mark 13
16
73.85 
67.31 
0.0314 
Design report team mark (max 10) 13
16
9 
8.13 
0.102 
Domestic (mix) 
International (mix) 
Software team mark (max 20) 13
16
15.77 
15.13 
0.0869 
Semester 2 individual mark 24
16
65.75 
67.31 
0.496 
Design report team mark 24
16
7 
8.13 
0.0244 
International (not mixed) 
International (mix) 
Software team mark 24
16
14.42 
15.13 
0.0322 
Semester 2 individual mark 65
13
76.75 
73.85 
0.1131 
Design report team mark 65
13
9.2 
9 
0.4325 
Domestic (not mixed) 
Domestic (mix) 
Software team mark 65
13
15.42 
15.77 
0.1814 
Table 9: Significance of differences in 2005 semester 2 marks  
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Graph 10: Team software results for release 1 
mixed or non-mixed team. This indicates that the results 
of the domestic students in mixed teams are not suffering 
and they gain many generic skills from the experience. 
The analysis of the amounts given in WPPPs did indicate 
a significant difference in both average individual 
amounts and total average amounts given to international 
students in mixed teams compared to international 
students in non-mixed teams and domestic students in 
mixed teams, indicating that there is a possible bias 
against international students in mixed teams. But the fact 
that there is a significant difference in the marks given to 
internationals in mixed teams versus internationals in 
non-mixed teams for team items such as design reports 
and software, and no significant difference in the overall 
marks indicates the allocations are reflecting actual 
performance. It is important to remember that both 
domestic and international students in mixed teams were 
giving higher amounts to the domestic students. 
6 Conclusion  
This paper investigated distribution pattern concerns 
about quantitative peer assessment. Equal distribution is a 
concern, if it is done for the wrong reason. The analysis 
has shown that individual students will distribute amounts 
equally, particularly international students. In Software 
Engineering Project four factors were influential in 
reducing equal distribution such that it rarely happens on 
a team wide basis. Consideration needs to be given to the 
amount that is distributed, releasing grades that show the 
impact of equal distribution and explaining to students the 
interpretation of distributing equally. Lecturers are 
concerned that some students are not honest about their 
own contribution. The analysis has shown this to be true, 
students are likely to give themselves the highest amount 
both too often and not enough, likewise, students give 
themselves the lowest amount both too often and not 
enough. This evidence suggests that the tool should not 
be used in isolation and that it is necessary to have other 
forms of evaluating the contribution of individuals to 
confirm the quantitative opinions of the students. Gender 
bias is a real concern but there was no conclusive 
consistent evidence that there was a gender bias. There 
was concern that international students consistently 
received lower amounts in mixed teams (from both 
domestic students and fellow international students) but 
an analysis of the results data concluded that there was no 
domicile bias and that peer assessments were reflecting 
actual (or at least perceived) performance. 
7 References 
Brown, R. (1995): Autorating: Getting Individual Marks 
from Team Marks and Enhancing Teamwork. 
Proceedings of Frontiers in Education Conference. 
Clark, N. (2005): Evaluating student teams developing 
unique industry projects. Proceedings of the seventh 
Australasian Conference on Computing Education. 
Newcastle, Australia 
Clark, N., Davies, P., Skeers, R. (2005): Self and Peer 
Assessment in Software Engineering Project. 
Proceedings of the seventh Australasian Conference 
on Computing Education. Newcastle, Australia 
Gates, A.Q., Delgado, N., Mondragon, O. (2000): A 
Structured Approach for Managing a Practical 
Software Engineering Course. ASEE/IEEE Frontiers in 
Education Conference, October, Kansas City. 1:21-26 
Hayes, J.H., Lethbridge, T.C., Port, D. (2003): Evaluating 
Individual Contribution Toward Group Software 
Engineering Projects. Proceedings of International 
Conference on Software Engineering, Portland, 
Oregon. 622-627 
Herbert, N., Ollington, R. (2006), Software Engineering 
Project: Project Manual version 9,  Accessed July 31, 
2006, http://www.comp.utas.edu.au/units/kxa351/ 
/2006ProjectManualv9.pdf 
Humphrey, W. (1997): Introduction to the Personal 
Software Process. Addison-Wesley. 
Kaufmann, D.B., Felder, R.M., Fuller, H. (2000): 
Accounting for individual effort in cooperative learning 
teams. Journal of Engineering Education. 89 (2), 133-
140. 
Layton, R.A., Ohland, M.W. (2001): Peer Ratings 
Revisited: Focus on Teamwork, Not Ability. 
Proceedings of American Society for Engineering 
Education Annual Conference, Albuquerque. 
Wilkins, D.E., Lawhead, P.B. (2000): Evaluating 
Individuals in Team Projects. Proceedings of the 31st  
SIGCSE Technical Symposium on Computer Science 
Education, Austin, Texas, 172-175 
